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Is Economic Development a Subject? 
Lloyd G. Reynolds 
A striking feature of postwar economics has been the "development boom. 11 In 1945 
anyone scanning library shelves for a book on economic development would have found only 
Schumpeter. There was probably not a single university course under this heading. Today 
there are dozens of such courses, several standard textbooks, scores of monographs, 
hundreds of articles and government reports. Economic development is among the two or 
three most popular specialties for students of economics. 
Yet it is not at all clear that economic development constitutes a distinct subject. 
Specialists in older branches of our science view this intruder in the curriculum with con­
siderable reserve. There is good reason for this skepticism. Work on the less developed 
countries has been heavily policy-oriented rather than scientifically oriented, more con­
cerned with projecting the future than with understanding the present and the past,. Nor is 
there any body of theory about early economic growth, comparable to the analytical tools 
available to the student of public finance or international trade. 
It may be useful, therefore, to look at the work of the past twenty years in perspec­
tive. Is economic development a subject, actual or potential? If potential, what shape 
can be discerned in the present embryo? 
A brief comment is needed on terminology. Geographically. development economists 
are concerned with the countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa (excepting South Africa 
and Japan). The least bad term for this group of countries is perhaps 11 less developed 
countries 11 or LDC's, which seems to have come into increasing use. The remaining 
nations--Australasia, South Africa, Japan, North America, Europe including the U.S. s. R. -­
should then be termed "more developed countries"(MDC's). This is, of course, a rank 
ordering rather than a simple dichotomy. Nations toward the top of the LDC list will 
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gradually move over into the MDC category (as, for example, Israel, Greece, Yugoslavia, 
Mexico). Nor is the ranking simply, or even primarily, in terms of per capita output. We 
place Japan in the MDC group not because its per capita output is high, but because its 
politico-economic organization is "modern" and because its economic growth has been 
sustained over a long period. 
Students of long-term change in the MDC 1 s usually say they are analyzing economic 
growth, while work on the LDC 1 s is usually labeled economic development. This is not a 
satisfactory distinction. Surely poor countries as well as rich countries may experience 
economic growth. It does not seem useful to say that the British economy was developing 
between 1750 and 1800, but growing between 1900 and 1950. The term "development 11 is 
ambiguous also because of ,its strong activist connotations. 
It seems best, therefore, to use growth to cover scientific analysis and development 
to cover policies aimed at initiating or accelerating growth. Growth (or its absence) is 
something one can measure, describe and try to explain. Development, which involves 
target-setting and policy formation, is something one tries to achieve. An understanding of 
how economic growth occurs is naturally useful in framing development policies. But con­
fusion of the two activities can only work mischief. 
The problem of this paper can now be posed more precisely: does economic analysis 
of today's LDC 1 s, including (but not limited to) study of early economic growth in these 
countries, constitute a distinct kind of work within economics? 
We shall approach the problem from three directions: first, do we now have plausible 
hypotheses about early economic growth in the LDC's? Second, what lines of research are 
presently underway or might usefully be undertaken, on these economies? Third, does this 
work involve merely application of established tools of "Western economics, " or does it 
involve a good deal of new tool-building? A finding that fresh theorizing is necessary 
-3-
would strengthen the view that here is indeed a valid scientific specialty. 
I. Old Dogmas and New Hypotheses 
The roots of the "development boom" were not primarily intellectual. Problems pre­
ceded theory, as has typically been true in economics. Between 1945 and 1960 a dozen 
colonial areas in Asia and two dozen in Africa achieved independent status. The United 
Nations provided a forum in which these new nations, along with older nations of Asia and 
Latin America, could voice their problems and needs. The dramatic income gap between 
richer and poorer nations, which has continued to widen over the past generation, pricked 
many consciences in the richer countries. Political rivalry among the industrial nations, 
and particularly between the United States and the U.S. S. R., placed the poor countries in 
a favorable position to bargain for economic assistance. 
The spectacular economic recovery of Western Europe in the wake of Marshall Plan 
aid encouraged a facile assumption that American capital could work equal miracles in other 
parts of the world. As loans and grants to Europe tapered off, loans and grants to the less 
developed countries were phased into an expanding U.S. aid programme. Almost by over­
sight the United States found itself in the business of promoting economic growth throughout 
the world, but with little knowledge of the economies which were supposedly to be trans­
formed. As the 'fifties wore on there was an increasing flow of loans and grants from 
Britain, Western Europe, the U.S. S. R. and the East European countries, and from inter­
national organizations. 
More or less simultaneously, there developed during the nineteen fifties a set of 
ideas which helped to rationalize these ongoing programs while also passing in some 
academic circles as a theory of early economic growth. The cardinal points of the older 
orthodoxy may be set out as follows: 
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1. There is a category of "underdeveloped countries, " sufficiently similar to warrant 
a general diagnosis and prescription. 
2. The people of these countries, or key leadership groups in these countries, have 
a strong interest in raising per capita output. 
3. The factor limiting the rate of economic growth is typically a shortage of capital. 
4. The relation between increments of capital and increments of output can be taken 
as reasonably constant, which enables one to transform output targets into capital 
requirements. 
5. Domestic saving is typically insufficient to finance a desirable growth rate. 
6. The gap between domestic savings and required capital formation can, however, 
be filled by capital transfers from abroad. 
7. Given adequate aid at the outset, a country's need for aid will eventually 
diminish and it will "take off" into self-sustained growth. 
This set of ideas was optimistic, policy-oriented, preoccupied with capital require­
ments, and fortified by casual empiricism. It visualized a future in which one after 
another of the poor nations will have "taken off," propelled by relatively short bursts of 
aid from the richer countries. Whatever its policy uses, its scientific effect was 
stultifying, for it announced that we already knew the answers when in fact serious 
research had scarcely begun. 
This view of the world appears most clearly in the writings of W.W. Rostow and Paul 
1
Rosenstein-Rodan. In a remarkable article published in 1961, Professor Rosenstein-Rodan 
projected the feasible growth rate of 81 LDC's (including such well-documented regions as 
1 Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, "International Aid for Underdeveloped Countries," Review of 
Economics and Statistics, May 1961, pp. 107-138. 
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'-' 
Laos and Nepal!) from 1961 to 1976, These growth rates were then converted into capital 
requirements by using a standard 3: 1 incremental capital-output ratio. Future domestic 
saving in each country was then projected. Estimates of future marginal savings rates were 
based on 1961 information concerning average savings rates, 1 which was apparently 
accepted as reliable. Finally, domestic saving was deducted from capital requirements to 
yield the "necessary capital inflow. 11 
This kind of political arithmetic is doubtless necessary in government departments. 
It is surprising only that it should have been presented as a serious piece of economic 
research. 
The Rostow 11 take-off" concept requires little comment, because it has already come 
under heavy and justified criticism. As regards the MDC's, things seem simply not to have 
happened as Rostow surmised. To be sure, careful reading of the original article 2 reveals 
that he committed himself to little in the way of testable hypotheses. On the few points 
where he did venture quantitative generalizations--rates of capital formation, rates of 
output increase--the evidence runs counter to his hypotheses. Professor Kuznets' con­
clusions on this matter carry weight: 
111 1n the majority of cases the marginal savings rate was assumed as roughly twice as high 
as the average rate" (p. 136). Since the article appeared in 1961, the 1961 base-year 
"data" presented on national output, population,. savings and other variables cannot have 
been actual measurements. As nearly as one can determine from footnotes, the 1961 
figures were projections by the author from actual data for 1957, drawn mainly from the 
U. N. National Accounts Yearbook, 1959. 
2 W.W. Rostow, "Take-off into Self-Sustained Growth, 11 Economic Journal. Subsequently, 
the doctrine was enlarged and somewhat vulgarized in a small book (W. W. Rostow, The 
Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960. Still later, 
the issues were discussed thoroughly and quite critically at a conference organized by the 
International Economic Association (see W~ w. Rostow (ed.). The Economics of the Take-Off, 
New York: Martin's Press, 1963. 
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"The capital formation rates, if they rise, climb at a sustained rate and for a much 
longer period tha the two or three decades of take-off. Rates of growth of total product, if 
they show any long-term acceleration (and those for only a few countries do within the 
period beginning with the take-off stage) increase slowly and certainly over a longer period 
than the short span of the take-off. .. I can only conclude that the available evidence lends 
1 
no support to Professor Rostow's suggestions." This view is reinforced by the detailed 
analysis of early economic growth in Britain, France, and other countries presented at the 
I.E. A. conference. 
As regards the LDC's, Rostow asserted, on the basis of a few years' data from the 
early 'fifties, that some of them were "attempting take-off. 
11 Such a statement surely has 
little meaning. The experience of repeated take-offs and landings in some countries since 
1950 suggests a helicopter rather than a jet aircraft simile. Bicanic' notion that nations 
creep painfully over the threshold of economic development is even more appropriate. 
If the earlier orthodoxy has collapsed, what remains? What do we actually know 
about early economic growth? Surely very little. We know little even about early growth 
in the older industrial countries, on which economic historians have been working for 
generations. We have little idea how far--if at all--conclusions drawn from 18th and 19th 
century growth are applicable to a quite different range of economies in the late twentieth 
century. We certainly do not have a long enough record for today's LDC's to determine 
which of them have embarked on a sustained growth path and how this happened. 
This is not to say that we are without ideas. It will be useful to advance a few 
hypotheses about early economic growth in today's LDC's--ideas which at some points run 
directly counter to the traditional doctrine. Let it be clear, however, that these are merely 
hypotheses, which can be tested only by much additional research. 
Simon Kuznets, "Notes on the take-off," in W.W. Rostow (ed.), op. cit. 1 
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1. Economic growth is not homogeneous. The countries which we label LDC' s are quite 
heterogeneous. No generalizations about economic structure and behavior apply equally to 
all. If one looked carefully at the MDC' s in the era when their accelerated growth began, 
their heterogeneity would doubtless appear equally great. Consider England in 1750, the 
U.S. A. in 1830, Japan in 1870. Growth itself gradually smooths out many differences and 
produces considerable resemblance among "mature" economies; but this is not true in the 
incipient stages. 
If countries enter on economic growth with differing internal structures and under 
different external circumstances, it follows that what happens in the early stages of growth 
will differ from one case to the next. True, output per capita rises, capital formation rises 
as a percentage of national product, and so on. But this is purely definitional--this is 
what we ~ by economic growth. It does not indicate that the initial factor endowment 
or the stimuli to growth, or the leading and lagging sectors, or the attendant institutional 
transformation were similar from case to case. One should not expect, then, to arrive at a 
single theory of early economic growth. 
2. Economic growth is gradual. It is not accomplished by a single "big push," nor is it 
compressed into a Rostovian take-off period of two to three decades. Rather, output per 
capita at first rises slowly, sometimes almost imperceptibly. The growth rate then gradu­
ally increases, and so does the capital formation rate, though there is no indication of a 
close relation between increments of capital and output. This acceleration continues for 
perhaps 50 to 75 years before the growth rate, the capital formation rate, and (possibly) the 
rate of population increase settle down on a kind of plateau. To a mediaeval historian 75 
years may seem a short period; but it is much longer than the ..take-off" periods visualized 
in much of the development literature. 
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Reasons for the inevitability of gradualness are not hard to find. In a new country it 
may take decades to establish secure political leadership, orderly procedures for the transfer 
of power, internal law and order, and other prerequisites for economic progress. Gradual­
ness is inherent also in the time required to lay down the physical infrastructure of a modern 
economy, and in the subsequent lag before other productive activities have "grown up" to 
the point of utilizing these facilities fully. Perhaps equally important is the slow turnover 
of human populations. It is a truism that the most important product of economic moderniza­
tion is a different kind of person, and that this different person is required for effective 
operation of the new facilities. If one starts today to educate all children aged 6, it will 
be twenty years before these children have reached peak productive efficiency. The higher 
the occupational level, the longer the gestation period. It may be thirty or forty years 
before highly-educated business managers, political leaders, agriculturalists and civil 
servants have taken over from their less well educated forbears. 
It is often said that poor nations today are determined to develop more rapidly than 
their predecessors, and optimistic projections are often embodied in "perspective plans. 11 
But future projections are less persuasive than past accomplishments. Where are the LDC's 
which have succeeded in modernizing their economies and achieving a sustained growth rate 
of, say, 2 percent per capita per year in less time than was required by the richer nations? 
One can point to Israel and Taiwan, but these are ·special cases. Both countries imported 
large quantities of human capital--administrators, business men, technicians, teachers-­
in the first case from Europe, and in the second from mainland China. Both countries 
received foreign funds which, relative to their small populations, were very large. In order 
not to grow, they would have had to be remarkably wasteful and inept. The growth of these 
two countries resembles the postwar reconstruction of Japan and Western Europe which, 
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given a rich endowment of human capital plus substantial imports of physical capital, were 
able to restore their productive capacity in a remarkably short time. 
3. Economic growth depends mainly on internal effort. The classic cases of almost com-
pletely self-financed development are Britain, Japan, and more recently the U.S. S. R. Some 
of the European countries, such as Sweden, received limited amounts of capital from abroad. 
The most substantial nineteenth-century capital movements, however, were to the frontiers 
This was part of a vast trans­of settlement in the United States and the British Dominions. 
fer of human beings as well as capital goods, combined with continuous settlement of new 
Had the foreign capital componentland and exploitation of additional natural resources. 
been missing, expansion might have been slower, but it is very unlikely that it would have 
been stopped. The willingness of British bankers to market American railroad bonds can 
scarcely be considered the key to the dramatic expansion of the American economy. 
It would be useful to compare contemporary growth rates in the LDC's (which are 
themselves difficult to determine
1) and to correlate these with various measures of foreign 
capital inflow. Even if such an exercise yielded a positive relation, one could not infer 
that the foreign capital was the source of more rapid growth. It is more likely that countries 
with a superior institutional framework and internal leadership, which are able on this 
account to grow faster than others, are considered superior credit risks and are able to 
attract larger amounts of foreign funds. Capital typically flows toward those who need it 
least. 
1 Estimates of gross national product by urban economists and statisticians are not 
reliable in a primarily agricultural economy where production data are poor and most 
of the product is non-marketed. It may even be that the concept of GNP, which was 
developed under modern American conditions, is a "rich country gadget. 
11 Greater 
importance ·should be attached to physical output series for major products, and in 
the absence of these no firm conclusions can be drawn. 
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4. Economic growth involved a diversified increase in output across a broad front. Some 
lines of production naturally grow faster than others, and there may even be a sensational 
spurt in one field (British cotton goods, 1780-1820, or Swedish timber output, 1830-1880). 
But these are not "leading sectors" in the sense of an engine pulling an inert mass. Rapid 
growth in one sector both requires and encourages growth in related activities. Unless 
conditions in the economy are broadly favorable to growth, as they were in the British and 
Swedish cases, expansion in a single sector will prove abortive. The colonial type of 
enclave economy is no exception. While a substantial rate of expansion may be achieved 
within the enclave, this typically fails to communicate itself to the mass of the population 
and to activate a general growth process. 
It is now generally recognized that increases in agricultural output are an indispens­
able feature of early economic growth. The industrialization of the MDC's was typically 
accompanied or preceded by substantial agricultural progress. In today's LDC's, too, the 
behavior of agriculture is the best single test of growth capacity. The reason is not just 
that higher agricultural output is essential in an expanding economy. but also that inability 
to activate agriculture is symptomatic of weaknesses in government leadership and admini- ! 
stration. Anyone can order a steel mill, but the intransigent problems of agriculture are a 
crucial test of innovational ability. 
5. Output expansion is accomplished initially by absorbing previously unused resources. 
In the conventional view economic growth is being held back by resource scarcities, and 
particularly by a shortage of capital. It is more accurate to say that, in a stagnant 
economy, the resources needed for a higher level of output are present but under-utilized 
There is often cultivable land which is not already under cultivation. Many workers may 
be unemployed or underemployed, and can be induced to work longer hours in industry or 
1 
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agriculture. Management and entrepreneurship may also be present but under-utilized. 
Nothing is more striking in the early growth history of the advanced countries than the ease 
with which merchants moved over into manufacturing, banking and other new activities as 
opportunities for profit appeared. They ended up working harder, making larger profits. 
contributing more to production. 
There are also indications that many LDC' s have unused saving capacity. It is not 
that investment is being held back by unwillingness to save. Rather, people who could 
save perceive only limited investment opportunities attended by high risk. If the outlook 
changes and the prospective yield of capital rises, saving will be undertaken. There is 
also unused saving potential in the fiscal mechanism. Lewis has argued that no country is 
too poor to devote, say, 20 percent of national output to public sector purposes. If actual 
revenues are small, and if the proportion of revenue devoted to investment is also small, 
the main reason may be weak government and poor public administration. 
The view that capital shortage is not a major barrier to early economic growth is 
supported also by the experience of the MDC's. Close students of early industrialization 
in Britain and Western Europe are of the opinion that finance was not a serious limitation on 
industrial development. Habbakuk, for example, states that perceived investment 
1opportunities typically generated the necessary capital, rather than vice versa. Deane 
and Cole ~ress the opinion, with respect to early eighteenth-century England, that "the 
limiting factors to an increase in capital formation seem to have operated more from the 
side of investment than from the side of saving. " 2 
1 See in particular his essay on II The historical experience on the basic conditions of 
economic progress," in L. Dupriez (ed.), Economic Progress (Louvain: Institut de Re­
icherches Economiques et Sociales, 1955) 
2 
Dupriez (ed.), op. cit., p. 260 
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If there is any basic scarcity in the LDC 1 s it is a scarcity of leadership, of ability to 
innovate in both the private and public sectors. This limitation has been heavily, and in 
our view correctly, emphasized by Hagen and Hirschman. 
6. Economic growth involves a transformation of politico-economic institutions. '!;he 
relevant economic institutions are those which affect factor and product markets. In labor 
markets this includes adequate training facilities, encouragement of desirable mobility, 
and modernized wage-setting practices. In capital markets it includes private and public 
banks, insurance companies and other savings institutions. In industry and commerce it 
means a gradual superseding of the small family business by large enterprise and prof.es­
sional management. In agriculture it means marketing facilities, sources of credit, avail­
ability of 11 modern 11 inputs, and technical assistance. 
It is unnecessary for a country to have a full panoply of such institutions before 
growth can begin. It need not have a stock exchange, or a social security system, or much 
corporate enterprise. To a large extent development of II modern II economic institutions is a 
by-product of economic growth. It was so in the older industrial countries, and it will be 
so in the LDC I s. At the same time, some minimum institutional base must exist quite early. 
The make-up of this minimum base is surely one of the key problems in growth economics. 
The governmental structure must also be broadly favorable before economic growth can ! 
begin. But again, we do not know what this means in concrete terms, Economists have 
skirted the issue and political scientists have not met it head-on. Moreover, orientation of 
government toward economic objectives, and improvement of its technical efficiency to 
attain those objectives, seems to be in good measure an accompaniment of long-sustained 
growth. Once economic modernization is underway, the political milieu becomes modified 
in a way progressively more favorable to continued growth. This "virtuous circle II can be 
traced in societies as diverse as those of Britain, the U.S. S. R. and Japan. 
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Discussion of the role of government in today's LDC's is afflicted by opposing dogmas. 
On one side is the nee-liberal view that, if government will stand out of the way, private 
initiative will mobilize increased resources and direct them toward the most productive uses. 
On the other side is the planning technician's view that government can generate growth 
through administrative actions, and can predict and regulate its pace. In most LDC' s, 
however, 80 to 90 percent of national output comes from the private sector. Here government 
cannot compel exxpansion, but must induce it by creating a structure of incentives which 
will lead producers to respond in the desired way. 
It would be helpful if speculative and ideological discussion of these matters were 
replaced by careful analysis of experience. VI/hat did governments in the MDC's contribute 
to early acceleration of growth in those countries? What have governments in selected 
LDC' s been doing over the past generation, and with what consequences? What kinds of 
action seem to have contributed to growth, and what policies have led to stagnation? There 
can in the end be no substitute for such Q detailed, case-by-case analysis of the historical 
record. 
II. The Positive Study of Less Developed Economies 
We turn now to our second main theme. What kinds of economic research can usefully 
be undertaken in the LDC' s? What is the potential content of the subject, viewed as a 
branch of positive economics? Is this content substantial enough to warrant considering 
this a separate specialtyr? 
The present state of the literature suggests that, if there is a subject here, it remains 
to be defined. Textbooks, research monographs, and course outlines represent a wide 
variety of concepts and approaches. Some universities, indeed, have several "development" 
courses and seminars, with little in common except the name. This clearly represents a 
stage of pre-scientific groping and experimentation. 
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A striking feature of the literature is its heavily normative character. Many courses 
and texts embody a "how-to-do-it" approach to the subject: arguments over balanced 
versus unbalanced growth, optimal savings rates, criteria for allocation of investment 
funds, choice of technology, sources of external finance, planning methodology. 
Practical problems have always been important in stimulating new developments in 
economic thought. But between initial problems and useful policy conclusions there has 
usually intervened a gradual and arduous development of positive economics; definition and 
measurement of important variables, analytical models intended to replicate important 
aspects of behavior, framing and testing of specific hypotheses, gradual emergence of a 
picture of the economy in operation. The puzzling thing about much early work on the 
LDC' s is the implicit assumption that this intervening stage can be by-passed, that one 
can create a body of policy prescriptions "hanging in the air, " unsupported by a structure 
of positive knowledge. It is rather as though there had been, in the United States in the 
1840's, an outburst of courses and textbooks on "how to improve the American economy and 
make it grow faster. " 
If one wants to engage in something other than current policy-making, what is there 
to do? What lines of research into the less developed economies may yield improved 
understanding of their operation, and lay a firmer basis for policy-making in the future? 
Three main lines of work, complementary rather than competitive, suggest themselves: 
micro-analysis of economic behavior in the LDC' s; study of total economies and their 
evolution over time; and building alternative models of early economic growth. 
Micro-analysis of Economic Behavior 
In the developed countries since the nineteen-thirties macro-economics has held the 
center of the stage and micro theory has been pushed into the background. The tacit 
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assumption is that the price mechanism works sufficiently well to warrant relative neglect 
of resource supplies and resource use. 
In the LDC 1 s this view is clearly not warranted. The market network is fragmentary, 
economic management (private and public) is sub-optimal, and innovation is laggard. This 
being so, detailed examination of the economy--sector by sector, market by market-­
becomes a matter of urgency. Little has yet been done in this direction. Scattered studies 
of this problem or that have lifted the corners of the veil covering a particular economy. 
But is there a single case in which we can see all round the economy in the way thqt is 
possible for Britain, France, Sweden, or Japan'? I think not. 
Agriculture, for example, is the largest industry in almost every LDC. The operation 
of the peasant household is central to an understanding of the economy. Several competing 
models appear in the literature: the "inert peasant, 11 who cultivates traditional crops in a 
traditional way, and is both ignorant of and unresponsive to possibilities of technical 
change; the "lazy peasant, " a satisficer who will work only to the extent necessary to 
achieve conventional standards of consumption; the "maximizing peasant," who knows the 
possibilities of product and factor substitution, makes correct marginal calculations, and 
is willing to invest to raise future output. But we do not know which of these models is 
most plausible, nor can we find out without more empirical study. 
The system of land ownership, and the division of output between owner and 
cultivator, may have important effects on labor input, choice of products and techniques, 
and receptiveness to technical change. Proposals for changes in the tenure system are 
warmly debated in many countries. In most cases little is known about the economic con­
sequences of one system or another. Yet quantitative analysis is often possible. One 
occasionally finds almost a laboratory situation, where the same crops are grown in the 
same area, under two or more tenure systems. In such cases input-output relations can 
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be examined, and one can ask whether land tenure per se has effects which can be 
segregated from those of other variables. 
There is a large literature, mostly of a speculative character, on the possible 
existence of II surplus labor, 11 "redundant labor," or "disguised unemployment" in the 
agricultural sector. It is doubtful that further verbal battles on this front can yield any 
positive product. But there is a shortage of studies in which precisely-framed hypotheses 
have been confronted with relevant data. Much of the verbal argument, indeed, relates to a 
situation which is rare in reality, that of a declining farm labor force. The common situa­
tion in the LDC's, however, is that high population growth is swelling the farm labor force. 
The interesting problem for study is how this growing labor force is absorbed (or not 
absorbed) into the rural economy, and what happens in the process to labor inputs per acre 
and to production methods. 
There is a growing body of evidence that, where alternative crops are feasible, 
peasant producers are responsibe to changes in relative prices. But this is a shift of pro­
duction rather than an expansion of production. Much less is known about how aggregate 
output responds to increased income possibilities. To put the point differently: what 
proportion of a potential increase in output must be left with the cultivator to persuade him 
to produce the output? Some material incentive is required, but there is little evidence on 
how much. 
Vve have not chosen agriculture for illustration because it has been especially under­
investigated. On the contrary, there has probably been more careful research on agriculture 
in the LDC' s than on any other sector. Knowledge is slight only in relation to the size and 
complexity of the industry. One could take any other branch of the economy--the public 
sector, factory industry, foreign trade--and find a large array of significant unanswered 
questions. 
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The micro-economic problems requiring investigation cut right across the economy. 
One interesting implication is that to proclaim oneself simply a "development economist" is 
not very different from calling oneself a general practitioner. Interest in the LDC's is in no 
way incompatible with adequate specialization in one or more functional areas of economics. 
One can aim at becoming a development economist_§__nd a public finance man, or an agricul­
tural economist., or a student of international trade. 
IntP.r-sectoral reJa.tions and econo_mic change 
Along with study of sectoral problems, there is need for some economists to view 
no.tional economies in the round. How does the economy of Chile operate? How do different 
industries and sectors interact? What structural changes and lines of expansion are 
observable over time? 
This is not conventional macro-economics, using only a few highly aggregated vari­
ables. A LDC is usually a quite fragmented economy, with relatively low inter-sectoral 
linJ:ages, clispante sectoral gre,wth rates, and acute problems of internal balance. Aggregate 
measu::-es of national output, employment, investment, and so on are unrevealing unless 
accompanied by sectoral measures. These are also quite open economies in which fluctua­
tions are induced more by external shocks than by changes in domestic investment. To 
c.nalyze how external influences ramify through the economy requires detailed knowledge of 
its structure. 
This kind of work requires dependable.sectoral measures of output, factor inputs, 
productivity and prices. It involves analysis of inter-sectoral movements of commodities, 
labor and finance. Input-output tables, national income and product statements, government 
budgets, balance of payments accounts, and other standard measurement devices are 
applicable. These can be fitted together into an internally consistent set of national 
economic accounts, revealing the anatomy of the economy in considerable detail. 
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This kind of analysis becomes increasingly interesting as it is extended over time. 
A few years' experience tells very little. At least twenty or thirty years is required to drnw 
significant conclusions about growth rates and structural changes in an economy. And even 
this may not suffice. Anyone observing Argentina over the years 1870-1914 must certainly 
have concluded that this economy had "taken off." From the high growth rates of 1870-1914, 
and the respectable growth rates of 1914-1929, it would have been quite impossible to 
predict the much slower growth in the years 1930-1960. 
In economies where one observes a sustained rise in per capita output over several 
decades interesting questions arise. Which kinds of output are increasing most rapidly? 
How far is the output increase attributable to increased factor use, how far to "the 
residual"? Does the impetus seem to be mainly internal or external? How are increased 
resources being mobilized and applied? Are sectoral bottlenecks or external constraints 
holding the growth rate below what it might otherwise be? 
This analysis of early economic growth necessarily involves notions about how 
growth occurs. While these are not yet very systematic, we do have some concepts and 
hypotheses which can help to order the historical record. The accumulation of longer 
records of experience for more countries will in turn contribute to improvement of "growth 
models." This interaction of theorizing and analytical description should be unusEally 
vigorous over the next generation, as is true in any rapidly-developing area of study.· 
Analysis of total economies may contribute also to a useful classification of LDC' s. 
Everyone recognizes that the universe of LDC's is heterogeneous. It is accepted that 
different empirical generalizations and analytical models are required for different types 
of economy. But no one can yet say what is meant by "type" in this connection. 
It is clear that per capita income is not a very useful basis of classification. Zambia 
and Venezuela stand quite high on the per capita income list; but few would argue that 
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Nor does current level of per capita income correlateZambia is more developed than Japan. 
well with growth rate. Argentina and Chile are relatively high-income 
countries, but their 
progress in recent decades has been slow. 
A more interesting basis of classification is relative factor availabiliti
es. The 
concept of II labor surplus economies
II represents this approach. The numerous countries 
which still have open frontiers might be termed 
II land surplus economies." Venezuela, Iran, 
and a few other oil rich countries might be considered "capital-surplus
 economies" in the 
sense that growth is not constrained by foreign exchange availability. 
But this is a rather static kind of classification. .Excess supply of one
 or more 
factors is compatible with either growth or stagnation. The rate of cha
nge in excess 
supplies is also significant. Is an initial surplus of labor shrinking ov
er time, or is it 
rising through a high rate of population growth plus a low rate of emplo
yment expansion? 
Seers has suggested 1 an output-mix classification, based partly on th
e importance 
of industry relative to primary production, partly on diversification of o
utput within each of 
His spectrum of economies runs from large and diversified industrialthese categories. 
economies such as the U.S.A. or U.S. S. R., at one pole,to the one-mi
neral economies 
This classification correlates rather wellrepresented at the extreme by the "oil sheikhdom. 
11 
v,rith size and openness of the economy. As one goes down the spectru
m, exports become 
For one-crop or one-mineral economies detailedincreasingly the lever of the economy. 
analysis of the mafor export industry is crucial. 
Still another approach, emphasized particularly by Myint, runs in term
s of the 
development of money transactions and a market mechanism. 
2 The process typically starts 
1Dudley Seers, "An approach to the short-period analysis of instability i
n prima1y-producing 
countries, 11 OE?, Feb. 1959. 
2 See·· in p\'.l.rt,:tcular Hla Myint,· The-Econom:i:cs· of.' Developing Countries 
(I~ortd"c'in:,.:•.. :.r; ·.:~L. ~J-Iu'.tchinson,, 19 64) .. 
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with sale of one or more export products for cash; but if this is all that happens, the economy 
remains underdeveloped. Only in so far as cash dealings, specialization in production, and 
trading relations spread gradually within the country can it be regarded as developing. Its 
degree of development is measured by how far it has moved toward full specialization, sale 
of products and factor services for cash, and economic integration through markets. Myint's 
or fail to move, inwork is rich in suggestions about how and why an economy may move, 
this direction. 
Suggestions for a typology of LDC's are thus not lacking. But there is not yet any 
agreed scheme. Progress in this direction requires further country-by-country analysis of 
particular economies. 
Theories of ~arly Economic Growth 
During the past twenty years there has been a spate of neo-Keynesian and neo-
1 
hundred contributions.classical growth models. A recent survey article lists upwards of a 
But most of this work is not relevant for present purposes. The standard assumptions of 
growth theory--one or at most two products, full mobility of factors, competitive pricing, 
constant returns to scale, constant elasticity of labor-capital substitution along well­
sbehaved production functions--are quite unrealistic even for the MDC' s. For the LDC 
I 
they verge on fantasy. Particularly restrictive is the common assumption of a single output 
and a single production function. The essence of underdevelopment is a sharp cleavage 
betv.reen "modern" and "traditional" production. Nor can one get round this by applying 
the standard growth theory only to the modern sector, leaving the much larger traditional 
sector in residual status. The behavior of the traditional sector as factor supplier and 
product demander, including its gradual transformation and annexation to the modern sector, 
is an integral part of early economic growth. 
1 F. H. Hahn and R. C. 0. Matthews, "The Theory of Economic Growth: A Survey, 
11 
Economic Journal, December 1964, pp. 779-902. 
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Related to this is the neglect of land and the primacy of capital in modem growth 
theory, which stamps it as industrially-oriented. A theory of early economic growth must 
explain what is happening in agriculture, which remains the largest sector of the economy 
for many decades after growth begins. The initial land-labor ratio, the organization of farm 
production, the nature of production functions and of producers I responses, the rate and 
factor bias of technical change, are key features of any usable growth model. 
It is not even clear at this stage what one should mean by a theory of early economic 
growth. There are several possible views. First, theory might aim at explaining how 
economic growth gets started in a previously stagnant economy. What are the minimum 
institutional pre-requisites? Given a favorable environment, what kinds of stimuli may set 
the mechanism of expansion in motion? Is export-led growth a frequent or even the usual 
case? Study of the preconditions of growth involves non-economic variables, some of which 
are difficult to quantify; and so economists tend to hold back from it. 
1 But there is little 
indication that political scientists, social anthropologists, or others are going to produce 
adequate theories of how economic growth begins. Economists, who in recent decades have 
tended to define the boundaries of their discipline more and more narrowly, should be 
venturesome enough to conduct some forays into this difficult area. 
Second, there is theorizing of a "biological" character. This emphasizes the alter-
native ways in which the money economy may penetrate a system of household production, 
and the changes in personal behavior, economic organization, and exchange relations which 
occur in the process. Institutional transformation is in the center of the stage, input-
output relations rather in the background. The ingenious work of Myint in this area has 
already been mentioned. 
1 A notable exception is Professor Everett Hagen. See his two volumes, On the Theory of 
Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962); 
and The Economics of Development (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1968). 
-22-
Third, there are theories in which quantitative production relations play a central 
role. These theories are mechanical in the sense that, given one or more sectoral production 
certain rates of output increase followfunctions, and given the rates of input increase, 
automatically. Economic growth has already begun "before the curtain rises," and the 
problem is to determine its rate and direction. This kind of work, exemplified by the Lewis 
and Fei-Ranis models, is attractive because of its quantitative character and the potentiality 
of statistical testing. 
Growth models adapted to the LDC' s, however, are still in an early stage of develop­
ment. Theoretical work has been focused on one kind of economy--the fully settled, heavily 
populated, "surplus labor" economy. The assumptions used are highly simplified, and the 
There hasconsequences of varying them in one direction or another need to be explored. 
been little analysis of other economic situations--for example, the country with an open 
frontier, or the economy with both unused land and unused labor time. 
Most serious, virtually all models to date have been closed-economy models. Trade 
are central facts of life in most of the LDC' s. Analysis ofand capital movements, however, 
the interrelations of growth and trade--on which a good deal of work has already been done 
by Johnson, Kindleberger, Myint, Meier and others--promises rich returns. Here the exist­
ence of a long tradition of trade theory is in one sense an advantage. On the other hand, the 
extremely simplified assumptions of most trade theory, leading to limited ability to predict 
actual trade flows, is a considerable weakness. Work in this area can perhaps contribute as 
much to improvement of trade theory as to building better models of economic growth. 
To sum up: one can conceive of a course on the LDC's which would be basically a 
course in positive economics. It would focus on the three kinds of work just described: 
abstract models of how economic growth begins and proceeds during its early decades; 
analysis of the structure and development of selected LDC' s, viewed as total systems; and 
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examination of the micro-economics of agriculture, industry, public finance, external trade, 
and so on in this range of economies. Much of the material covered would be relevant to 
economic policy; but the course would not be organized around policy issues or normative 
concepts. 
The list of useful reading for such a course is still short. But in view of the growing 
volume of work on the LDC I s, the literature should be richer a decade from now. Meanwhile 
it is important to set out the right boxes, even if some of them remain almost empty for the 
time being. 
IIL The Relevance of "Western Economics" 
Economists and students from the LDC' s often assert, with varying degrees of strength, 
that the economic theory taught in British and American graduate schools is not very relevant 
to their own economies. Some Western economists fall in with this assertion, while others 
react strongly against it. The issue is clearly important to our present concern. If a 
Western-traim.:d economist can employ, his usual tool-kit as effectively in Thailand as in 
Gern-:any, if he in fact finds no need for additional tools, the case that study of the LDC's 
constitutes a distinct specialty becomes less convincing. 
It is often not clear what critics of Western economics really mean. One possible 
meaning may be eliminated at the outset. Use of Vl/estern economic analysis is sometimes 
identified with a particular policy stance, with idealization of the market mechanism and a 
suspicion of government activity. This is simply confusion. There is no reason why such 
concepts as utility, preference, production possibilities, or opportunity cost should be 
identified with any one institutional setting. Since the work of Lange and Lerner in the 
'thirties it has been accepted that the apparatus of micro-economics can be redirected 
toward management of a socialist system. 
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Setting aside this misunderstanding, a statement about the limited relevance of 
Western economics may mean at least four different things: (1) it may .nean that 
guan_titative relations among economic variables are different and will need to be reestimaterl 
in the LDC's; (2) it may mean that personal behavior is "less economic" in the LDC's, so 
that one cannot assume the usual responses to material incentives; (3) it may mean that the 
priority of problems is different in the LDC's, with a consequent difference in the relative 
importance of analytical tools; (4) it may mean that, because of structural differences in the 
economy and society, one has to develop new tools for explanatory and policy purposes. 
The first statement is self-evidently true. For the Western economies, we know a 
good deal about price and income elasticities of demand, input-output relations, returns to 
labor and capital, consumption and investment functions, and so on. This knowledge is not 
directly transferable to an economy operating at a much lower income level, with different 
factor supplies, technology, and organization. Functional relations must be estimated 
anew by painstaking research, as is still being done in the MDC's. Because of the frag­
mentation of the less developed economies, there should be greater attention to particular 
sectors and industries, and greater skepticism about the stability of aggregative coeffici­
ents, than is needed in a more integrated economy. 
These differences in coefficients, however, are not damaging to the logical structure 
1
of economics. The second kind of statement, which alleges non-economic behavior, would 
be decidedly damaging. But how convincing are such allegations? 
Tests of economic rationality must be framed with care. It is not sufficient to show 
that individuals' preference systems are different in the LDC's. New factory workers in 
Kenya may give less weight than American workers to security of job tenure relative to 
money income. Medium-income families in Brazil may save a smaller proportion of income 
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than medium-income families in France or Canada. Manufacturers in Pakistan may show 
greater risk aversion and shorter time-horizons than their counterparts in developed 
countries. Such differences are readily accommodated within the framework of economic 
analysis. 
Nor is the relevant question whether peasant producers, for example, behave as the 
outside observer concludes that they "ought" to behave. The peasant's subjective situation, 
the alternatives which appear open to him, and the considerations relevant to choice may be 
quite different from the situation as viewed by the educated, middle-class, and perhaps 
foreign .observer. Given the subjective situation, the question is, first, whether material 
welfare is prominent among the decision criteria, and second, whether the direction of 
reactions is "normal, 11 i.e. whether higher levels of material satisfaction are preferred over 
lower levels. 
There is much evidence supporting an affirmative answer. As regards peasant pro­
ducers, several research workers have concluded that, given the techniques which they 
know, peasants apply labor and capital to land as far as it is reasonable to do so, i.e. 
until marginal rates of return have- fallen to a low level. Moreover, where peasants produce 
for market and where two or more crops are open to them, there is evidence of marked 
responsiveness to changes in relative product prices. If one crop becomes more advantage­
ous than before, the proportion of acreage devoted to this crop rises with only a short 
time-lag. 
As regards labor, there is little doubt that workers prefer higher-wage jobs to lower­
wage ones. But it is sometimes asserted that a limited view of consumption possibilities 
sets a low ceiling to income aspirations. Once the ceiling is reached, the amount of labor 
offered varies inversely with the hourly wage--the labor supply curve bends backward. The 
writer was at some pains to test this hypothesis as regards new factory workers in 
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Puerto Rico, a group which is untypical only as regards the strong demonstration effect of 
readily available American consumer goods. For this group there was convincing evidence 
that income aspirations were quite elastic. Workers wanted more money, knew what they 
would do with it, and were willing to work longer hours to obtain it wherever factory 
schedules permitted. 1 Elliot Berg has reported similar findings from studies of African 
workers. 2 
There are pro]Jably two reasons for the wide currency of the backward-bending supply 
curve notion. First, it has long been a standard argument offered by employers, particularly 
foreign employers of indigenous labor, in defense of a low-wage policy. Nor is this defense 
at all new. Two centuries ago early English industrialists argued that higher wages would 
lead only to greater idleness, a conclusion which was challenged by Adam Smith, 3 Second, ' 
the argument is associated with the peculiar circumstances of migratory labor in certain 
parts of Africa. Here the family does not accompany the worker to his place of wage employ-­
ment, the wife does not become a consumer, and the normal pressures for a higher scale of 
household expenditure are inoperative. It is not surprising, then, that men work only long 
enough to acquire a few readily transportable consumer goods--bicycles, radios, etc. --or 
to accumulate the customary bride price in their area, On a world view, however, this 
system of employment is quite untypical. 
The third line of attack noted above--that the priority ranking of policy issues differs 
as between MDC's and LDC 1s--is on firmer ground. The following areas, for example, seem 
see Lloyd G. Reynolds and Peter Gregory Wages, Productivity, and Industrialization in 
Puerto Rico (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc, 1965), 
2Elliot I. Berg, "Backward-sloping labor supply functions: The African case," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, August 1961, pp. 468-492. 
3 "A plentiful subsistence... it has been concluded, relaxes, and a scant one quickens 
their industry. That a little more plenty than ordinary may render some workmen idle cannot 
be doubted; but that it should have this effect on the greater partt;-tseems not very probable. 11 
(Wealth of Nations, Everyman Edition, Volume I, p, 74), 
1 
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to deserve a higher relative ranking in the LDC' s: agricultural organization and produc-
tivity: demography and population growth; the economics of small scale industry; the micro 
aspects of taxation and public expenditure; and international trade and capital movements. 
To the extent that economics is viewed as a policy instrument, then, there is a 
corresponding re-ranking of the usefulness of analytical tools. The basic tools of micro­
economics are highly useful in the LDC I s, whether applied to agricultural production. the 
economics of industry, the impact of taxation, or cost-benefit analysis of public sector 
projects. w·estern macro-economics is considerably less useful. Paradoxically, modern 
growth theory has little to offer to economies in which growth is the most urgent practical 
problem. Post-Keynesian theories of income determination and economic fluctuations are 
also not readily transferable to the LDC 1 s. Thus the tendency in many Western graduate 
schools to emphasize a kind of macro-economics adapted to MDC institutions. while 
relegating micro-economics to a secondary place, is precisely the wrong thing for students 
from the less developed countries. 
This still does not answer the fourth question posed above, which is perhaps the most 
fundamental. Does analysis of the less developed economies require simply a reshuffling 
of the same instruments, a lifting of different tools from what remains essentially the same 
tool-kit? Or does it require also a significant amount of new tool construction? Is there a 
new species of "LDC economics" in process of development, or at least capable of being 
developed? 
These are complex and difficult questions and the answers depend on the level of 
abstraction under consideration. Such concepts as individual preference systems or produc­
tion functions are so fundamental that any kind of economic reasoning must take them as a 
point of departure. At this level one can argue that economics is independent of time and 
space. But economics does not consist solely of such basic ideas. There is a hierarchy of 
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theoretical constructs, ranging from the simple and general to the quite complex and 
specific--from, say. the concept of profit maximization to a model of investment decisions 
in the steel industry in contemporary United States. As theory comes closer to grappling with , 
a specific body of phenomena, its structure becomes more elaborate, specific, and 
empirically oriented. 
At some stage of elaboration and specialization the kind of theory required to explain 
a certain range of economic phenomena in a LDC--the variables to be included, the presumed 
relations among them, the specific hypotheses to be tested--begins to differ significantly 
from that which is relevant to the MDC' s. Experience in having worked on similar problems 
in a MDC may be useful as background. But it is only background? and does not obviate the 
need for new theoretical constructs and new research design. 
This can be illustrated from a variety of fields. We have already noted that the kind 
of growth theory relevant to the LDC's is considerably different from that currently being 
developed for the advanced industrial countries. This is true also of short-run macro­
economics. The fact that fluctuations are externally induced rather than investment­
induced, and that they impinge on economies with a small public sector, a primitive 
monetary system, and serious supply inelasticities changes both the analysis of fluctuations 
and the nature of stabilization measures. 
While Latin American theories of "structural inflation" may be partly an apologia for 
fiscal laxity, they are not wholly that. Monetary processes and price behavior do differ 
from the corresponding processes in the MDC's, and require fresh lines of analysis. 
There has been a strong reaction against standard international trade theory in the 
LDC's, most marked again in Latin America. While some of the counter-reasoning advanced 
from the LDC' s may appear implausible, the deficiencies of trade theory are undoubtedly real. 
Work has focused on comparative advantage and optimal trade patterns at a point in time, 
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with given factor supplies and identical production functions in each trading nation. But 
the assumption of identical production functions between MDC's and LDC's is unacceptable 
•:o definition. How to import technology, and what technology to import is a major policy 
issue. The problem of the LDC' s, as Chenery 1 and others have shown, is to define 
dynamic comparative advantage under conditions in which tastes, relative factor supplies 
and prices, and technology are all subject to rapid change. Analysis of the dynamics of 
trade relations, which in the MDC's may appear merely interesting, is for the LDC's a 
vital necessity. There is need for fresh theoretical and empirical work, conventional in 
the sense of being linked to a long tradition of past work, but original in placing structural 
change over time in the center of the picture. 
In agriculture, theorizing about the production-consumption behavior of peasant 
households 2 is significantly different from the production economics of a midwestern 
American farm. In industry, models of the isolated profit-maximizing firm or of the inter­
action of firms in a competitive industry are useful but by no means sufficient. There are 
problems of distinguishing private from social profitability. of estimating returns to a 
complex of interrelated investments ten or twenty years in the future, of devising efficient 
sequences of investment a la Hirschman. These kinds of analysis are similar in being 
time-related, forward-looking, and extending beyond the bounds of a single industry. They 
rest in a sense on standard micro concepts. But these concepts must be manipulated in new 
ways to explore, not optimal resource allocation at a moment, but optimality over extended 
periods of time. 
Thus an industrial economist, or agricultural economist, or international economist 
will find himself becoming a different kind of economist as he works on the structure of the 
1Hollis B. Chenery, "Comparative advantage and development policy," American Economic 
Review, March 1961, pp. 18-51. 
2see, for example, A. K. Sen, "Peasants and dualism, with or without surplus labor, " 
Journal of Political Economy. October 1966, pp. 425-450. 
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LDC's. He will have a certain expertise not possessed by those who have not strayed 
outside the developed world. He will necessarily have to make new theoretical contribu-
tions to achieve significant research results. In this sense there ..i§. something new about 
development economics. 
IV. Concluding Comments 
Vile return to the question posed at the beginning: is there here a potential subject, 
which may in time occupy an established position alongside older branches of economics? 
An affirmative answer seems warranted, but with qualifications. 
1. There is not as yet any substantial body of knowledge about the less developed 
economies. There is not a single LDC whose economy is now understood in the way that 
the British or American economies are understood. This is due partly to data deficiencies 
but mainly to lack of careful investigation. 
2. Development economics should not be construed simply as an exercise in 
economic engineering. directed at current policy problems. The core of the subject is, or 
should be, an effort to understand the operation of the less developed economies. Such an 
understanding, acquired through decades of careful effort, has been necessary for policy 
formation in the MDC's. It seems very likely that comparable effort will be required in 
the LDC's. 
3. If this view is accepted, the "economic development" label should be replaced 
by a broader and more neutral title. "Early economic growth" would be better, but still too 
restrictive. 11 Structure and growth of less developed economies, 11 or simple "economics of 
the less developed countries," would be in the right direction. 
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4. The range of possible investigation in the less developed economies is hopelessly 
wide. No one can prudently set up as an expert on all aspects of all LDC's.. Specializa-
tion is required, either on a territorial basis or, as may seem more profitable to most 
economists, on a functional basis. It was hence suggested that those wishing to work in 
the LDC's might well start from a solid foundation in one or more functional specialties. 
S. Investigation of the LDC' s is not merely a matter of applying familiar analytical 
tools to new data. New theorizing is required both in attacking specialized research 
problems and in constructing general models of early economic growth. This will gradually 
build the solid intellectual core which is still largely lacking. 
A considerable number of economists are already working along these lines, and 
their number seems certain to increase in the years ahead. A generation from now it should 
be possible to give a less qualified "Yes" answer to the topic of this paper. 
I 
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